JUSTICE IN ZIMBABWE 89 ____________________________________________________________________ existence of a reasonable suspicion. The only evidence in the indictment papers alleged against the accused was that two co-accused had allegedly made confessions to the police implicating them in the murder. These confessions were almost certainly not admissible even against the persons who made them, and were definitely not admissible against co-accused in bail applications. There was ample legal authority, counsel argued, for the proposition that an extra-curial statement made by a conspirator, after his arrest and after the conspiracy has ended, is admissible only against the maker and not against a co-conspirator. Significantly, the State had dropped the charges against Spooner who was similarly implicated by the alleged confessions. He submitted that: “… the State’s persistence in appealing against the grant of bail, failing to obey orders for release on bail of both the High Court and Supreme Court and now seeking to indict the Applicants without any admissible evidence … constitutes a gross abuse of process clearly designed to harass Applicants. In the absence of a credible explanation for such conduct from the law officers it is difficult to avoid the conclusion of intervention for political reasons.” On 1 August 2002 Mr Justice Chiweshe discharged the provisional order. He accepted that an indictment could be challenged on the basis that there was no reasonable suspicion that the person indicted had committed the crime charged. Without referring to the information contained in the indictment, he found that there was a reasonable suspicion in the present case. He said: The admissibility or otherwise of any facts or evidence that the state may seek to establish or adduce is not a factor for consideration at this stage. Applicants seek a ruling on the basis that whatever evidence the state may have in the form of confessions by co-accused in which applicants are implicated would ordinarily be inadmissible as against the applicants and therefore no reasonable suspicion could be held to exist that the applicants committed an offence. With respect that would amount to an unjustifiable extension of the test to be applied. In my view such issues stand for determination by the trial court. Suffice it to say that where an accused person implicates another in circumstances such as the