Appendix 2 Post Election violence: The context Although the March 2008 poll was probably the most peaceful election held in Zimbabwe since 1980, the aftermath has produced a crisis of major proportions. Shocked by their rejection at the polls, ZANU PF immediately began a process of damage control, and this was covered in detail by the Human Rights Forum in its report of 5 May 2008. The most important aspect of this aftermath lay in the delay over the publication of the results of the Presidential poll, which remained unknown for over a month, and were only finally released on 2 May 2008. The point at issue was whether Morgan Tsvangirai had won with a mere majority or an absolute majority. If the former was the case, it would be necessary to hold a Run-off between the top two candidates in the Presidential poll, and hence a contest between Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe. If the latter, Morgan Tsvangirai immediately should then have been appointed President of Zimbabwe.26 As it transpired, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission [ZAC] announced that Morgan Tsvangirai had won with 47.9% of the vote to 43.2% for Robert Mugabe, although, and contrary to the procedures for all the other three elections, ZEC did not release the detailed results for the Presidential poll. This clearly gave rise to all manner of speculations about whether this result was accurate or stagemanaged.27 Whether this was the case or not, there was nonetheless the very clear demonstration that ZANU PF and Robert Mugabe had been rejected by the Zimbabwean electorate, and considerable scepticism about whether ZANU PF and Robert Mugabe could win the second round, particularly if all the voters that had polled for Simba Makoni moved their allegiance to Morgan Tsvangirai. In very simple terms, if Simba Makoni’s 8.3% [according to ZEC] of the vote shifted to Tsvangirai, then the latter would win with 56% of the vote, and he would be the next President of Zimbabwe, and the MDC would form the new government.28 The MDC initially indicated that it had won the Presidential election outright, and declared no need for a Run-off. The party subsequently stated that it would participate, but under duress. There was enormous pressure for the MDC to participate, but also a growing constituency arguing in favour of abandoning the Run-off for negotiations for a power sharing arrangement. 26 27 28 See SITO (2008), The Inconvenient Truth. A complete guide to the delay in releasing the results of Zimbabwe’s presidential poll. Prepared by Derek Matyszak of the Research and Advocacy Unit, Zimbabwe. IDASA: PRETORIA; SITO (2008), THE INCONVENIENT TRUTH (PART II). A complete guide to the recount of votes in Zimbabwe’s “harmonised” elections. Derek Matyszak, Research and Advocacy Unit, Zimbabwe. IDASA: PRETORIA. See SITO (2008), ZIMBABWE ELECTIONS 2008. Examining The Popular and Presidential Choice - Hiding or Run Off? IDASA: PRETORIA; SITO (2008), What happened in the Presidential election? Research & Advocacy Unit, Zimbabwe. IDASA: PRETORIA. A recent opinion from the Southern African Litigation Centre [SALC] suggests a more serious problem: in terms of Zimbabwe’s electoral law, and because of the delay in the run off, Morgan Tsvangirai should be appointed President as a result of his having the majority. Here see Ex Parte: SOUTHERN AFRICA LITIGATION CENTRE. In re: THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE DETERMINATION AND DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE EVENT OF AN UNLAWFUL RUNOFF; SOUTHERN AFRICA LITIGATION CENTRE. LAWFULNESS OF ZIMBABWE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF.