articles having a political significance; or (d) attends a political meeting or assembly when wearing the uniform of the Police Force or any part of such uniform likely to identify him as a Regular Force member.21 Within Zimbabwe’s security forces, it is the CIO alone, the intelligence service, that has no legislative framework guiding its institutional set up and operations. Although it is a department within the President’s Office—the Department for State Security—with a minister responsible for it, and a director-general in charge of it, there is little information available on its functions. In practice, the CIO has operated more as a ZANU-PF intelligence agency and has been implicated in serious human rights abuses against ZANU-PF’s political opponents and civil society activists including torture, beatings, harassment and enforced disappearances.22 The National Security Council (NSC) has not had any impact on Zimbabwe’s security sector as the body has remained dysfunctional owing to infrequent meetings. Instead, the Joint Operations Command (JOC), comprising Mugabe and the heads of the security forces, but without representation from the MDC leaders, continues to meet to discuss and decide on national security issues from a ZANU-PF perspective.23 Existing national laws and regulations, if complied with, seem sufficient to ensure nonpartisanship, independence and professionalism within the security forces. However, as indicated, and demonstrated elsewhere in this report, these laws and regulations are ignored with impunity at the highest level within the security forces. It is for these same reasons that the new constitution is unlikely to reform the security sector or create an environment conducive for the holding of credible, free and fair elections. Without personnel changes within the partisan leadership of Zimbabwe’s security forces, any new laws prescribing security sector changes are likely to be similarly ignored. Reforming the security forces will need to go beyond the legal framework to replacing the 21 Schedule to the Police Act, Chapter 11:10 Act 22 of 2001, art. 48. See for example, Zimbabwe Peace Project Monthly Monitor, October 2012 and the Research and Advocacy Unity (RAU) report, “Zimbabwe’s Security Sector: Who Calls the Shots,” Derek Matyszak, Harare (undated). 22 23 Human Rights Watch interview with senior MDC official, Harare, February 14, 2013. See also, “Mugabe meets Service chiefs behind PM’s back,” The Standard, http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2012/10/01/mugabe-meets-service-chiefs-behind-pmsback/ (accessed October 1, 2012). THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 14