APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 79 Violence as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Youths in the 2007 Kenyan Elections 79 processes. The context of Mwagiru’s definition applies to the state as well as perpetrators of violence. Conversely, where the victim becomes the perpetrator, the definition can take the form of ‘a tool of trade’ that aims at ‘intimidation’ and ‘disempowerment of political proponents’ for purposes of accessing power.13 Factors of political economy can at times lead to violence, especially when the state is structured in such a way that some elements of the population are or feel excluded from meaningfully participating in it or from access to its resources and opportunities.14 Political life in Kenya developed based on ethnic interests, which led to stateencouraged rent-seeking activities. For instance, during Kenyatta’s tenure (1963–1978), indigenous capital development favored the Kikuyu, of which he was a member. Under the Moi (Kalenjin) regime (1978–2002) and Kibaki’s (Kikuyu) government (2002–2007), their ethnic kin benefited. This pattern resulted in inequalities in development in some areas, such as the North Eastern province and parts of Nyanza, Western, Eastern, and Coast provinces, which are relatively poorer compared to Nairobi and Central province because of their limited access to political power.15 The nature of deprivation is evident in the country’s (arid and semi-arid) North Eastern province, informal settlements in most towns, and rural areas afflicted by underdevelopment and poverty. Furthermore, pastoralism, a major economic activity in parts of the northern Rift Valley, upper Eastern, and North Eastern provinces, had been considered a low priority by successive governments, leading to far-reaching consequences for these communities in terms of the dearth of opportunity creation and the perpetuation of deprivation.16 Structural deprivation had deepened after independence due to poor governance policies, lack of children’s rights, failure to prioritize education, and negligence in skills development and employment. Such deprivation became a mobilizing factor along ethno-political lines, creating hopelessness among Kenya’s youths, rendering them gullible, potentially violent, and ‘not ready for self-reliance’.17 The term youth remains contested, with some people viewing it as a social construct having less to do with age, and more to do with status and behavior intrinsically linked to the transition from childhood to adulthood and assuming certain roles. The United Nations defines youths as people between eighteen and twenty-four years of age. In 2006 they comprised 18 percent of the world’s population, totaling more than 1 billion. Some 85 percent of them lived in developing countries.18 The Kenya National Youth Policy defines youth as ‘those aged between 15–30 years, taking into consideration their physical, cultural, psychological, socio-economic and political dimensions’.19 The study here uses this last description as its operational definition of youth. 13. Makumi Mwagiru, ‘Political and electoral violence in Kenya’, as cited in Roland Schwartz (ed.), ‘Political and electoral violence in East Africa’, Working Papers on Conflict Management no. 2, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Centre for Conflict Research, Nairobi, 2001, 6–7. 14. Laurie Nathan, ‘ “The four horsemen of the Apocalypse”: The structural causes of crisis and violence in Africa’, Peace and Change, 25:5 (2000). 15. John O. Oucho, Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya (Leiden, Brill, 2002), 55. 16. Ibid., 44–57. 17. McIntyre, Invisible Stakeholders. 18. United Nations Development Programme, Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis? (New York, UNDP, 2006), 15–16, www.undp.org/cpr/whats_new/UNDP_Youth_PN.pdf. 19. Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, ‘Kenya national youth policy’, Nairobi, 2006, 1–5.