Election observers and scholars noted that in the post-2000 elections voter registration was deliberately made difficult for urban residents and easy for rural communities, an observation that ZESN noted in its 2008 and 2013 election reports. These challenges centred on different voter registration requirements and processes for urban and rural communities, which favoured rural areas where ZANU-PF was perceived to be strong. As a result, while voter registration in rural areas was 99%, it was only 67% in urban areas.20 Another telling statistic on challenges associated with the voter registration process and the voters’ roll in preBVR Zimbabwe was the rejection rate of voters at polling stations on Election Day. In 2013, a significant number of voters were turned-away on voting day. The bulk of these were in urban areas where 25 people or more prospective voters were turned away at 82% of polling station observed by ZESN, compared to 38% of polling stations observed by ZESN in rural areas on Election Day. In the absence of access to the electronic voters’ roll in 2013, ZESN, based on its demographic analysis and observation of the voters’ roll inspection and registration process, concluded that the final roll, maintained (1.) unequal and inequitable patterns of access, (2.) was exclusionary, (3.) was prejudicial and (4.) disenfranchised urban and youth voters. The voters’ roll as a result, severely undermined the credibility of the entire electoral process, and violated the principle of full participation of citizens in electoral processes and the equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote as expressed in the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. 21 Increased speculation that other flaws existed in the voters’ roll exacerbated the historical challenges with the voters’ roll stated above. This speculation included allegations on how the voters’ roll had 60,000 police officers registered to vote, yet the police force in total numbered 33,000, and also how an estimated 838,000 people on the voters’ roll shared the same name but different identity numbers. Also, the voters’ roll had over 109,000 people over the age of 100, and 350,000 over the age of 85, which is not demographically supported by other national statistics.22 According to the Research and Advocacy Unit’s (RAU) audit of the 2013 voters’ roll, the voters’ numbers was inflated by over a million, as a result of duplications, and errors on the voters’ roll. RAU also noted massive under registration of young people and urbanites. Some of the findings in the RAU report did find some corroboration after ZESN conducted a voters’ roll audit of Marondera Central constituency ahead of a by-election in 2015. 23 A historical analysis of voter registration trends in Zimbabwe shows that registration has been relatively high when compared to the population of eligible voters. Figure 3 shows the registration figures from 20 ZESN (2013). Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonized Election. Harare. Zimbabwe ZESN (2013) Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonized Elections. Harare. Zimbabwe 22 Southall, R. (2013). How and Why ZANU-PF Won the 2013 Zimbabwe Elections. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 35(2), 135. 23 ZESN (2015) Analysis of the Zimbabwe Voters’ Roll: A comparative analysis of the main and Supplementary Voters’ register of Marondera Central Constituency. Harare. Zimbabwe. 21 14