The debate over which of these to adopt centres on the need to remove senile and debilitated judges from office, as against the need to retain experienced and learned judges who are healthy enough to continue serving. Giving judges life tenure creates the risk of judges who are clearly incompetent remaining in office well beyond their useful time. In the United States, judges of the Supreme Court and Federal Court have life tenure. The retirement age for judges in state courts in the United States is variable; a number of states have no mandated retirement ages, while others range from 70 to 75 years of age. Most other countries have an upper age limit, after which a judge must retire. Zimbabwe has the relatively young retirement age of 65, with a possible extension to 70 if the judge so elects and produces a medical report showing that he or she is mentally and physically fit to continue in office. Any specified retirement age is inevitably an arbitrary figure. There is usually no scientific or sociological reason to pick on a particular age as the time when an individual should retire. The third option – tenure for a specified period – appears to be unusual. Only the Constitutional Court of South Africa seems to have adopted that system. Judges of that court hold office for a non-renewable term of twelve years or until they reach the age of 70 years, whichever occurs first. The idea was to ensure a regular rotation of judges in the Constitutional Court, so that constitutional interpretation reflected changing attitudes of society. Removal from office and grounds for removal Obviously judges sometimes have to be removed from office, and the grounds for doing so and the procedure to be followed should be laid down in the constitution. In Zimbabwe, a judge may only be removed from office for inability to discharge the functions of his office, whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause, or for misbehaviour. These grounds are similar to those specified in many other countries such as Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Australia, Canada and India; South Africa and Uganda add gross incompetence as a further ground. “Misbehaviour” is not defined in our Constitution or in any of the others mentioned above, but it can be taken to mean misbehaviour in matters concerning the office of judge and would include a conviction for an offence that would render the person unfit to carry out judicial functions. Official misconduct and neglect of official duties would probably constitute misbehaviour. Whether incompetence (in the sense of persistently reaching illogical or perverse decisions) would constitute misbehaviour is less than clear, but could arguably be regarded as inability to discharge the functions of office. Poor legal knowledge may also fall into this category. The new constitution should state the grounds for removal of judges as broadly as they are stated in the present Constitution, but should perhaps add gross incompetence as a further separate ground. And, if a judicial code of ethics is formulated (see below), serious breaches of that code should constitute misbehaviour meriting removal from office. Procedure for removal from office In most constitutions the procedure for removing judges from office is lengthy and cumbersome, which ensures that judges cannot be lightly threatened with removal. 61