• have been qualified to practise as a legal practitioner in Zimbabwe for at least
seven years.
These qualifications seem reasonable. Should the new constitution specify any
others – such as, age, race or gender, political opinions or background?
• Age: It seems unnecessary to specify a minimum age for appointment to the
Bench. If a candidate has already served as a judge in a foreign country, or has
been qualified to practise in the legal profession for seven years, then he or she
should be mature enough to serve as a judge. The question of a maximum age for
judges will be dealt with later, under security of tenure.
• Race or gender: Should there be any racial or gender considerations, as required
in South Africa? There are arguments for and against this sort of affirmative
action. Race should be irrelevant 31 years after independence. While women
constitute a little over 50 per cent of the population, the same does not apply to
the legal profession so there is smaller pool of qualified persons to choose from.
Although gender balance is desirable on the Bench, over-emphasis of a person’s
gender at the expense of his or her ability and suitability for the office must be
avoided. The appointment of judges who are not highly skilled is more likely to
undermine public confidence in the administration of justice than an
unrepresentative judiciary.
• Political opinions: Selection on the basis of a candidate’s known conservative or
liberal tendencies (as in the US) should be avoided. Lawyers, like anyone else,
have their views on political and social issues, but a conscientious judge will avoid
letting these views affect his or her decisions. A litigant or accused person should
not feel that the case will be determined because of the judge’s political views.
• Disqualification of former politicians: Zimbabwe has a long tradition of appointing
former Ministers of Justice to the Bench. Some have been good judges, some
have not. There is no reason in principle why former politicians should not be
considered for appointment as judges, but a sideways step from ministerial office
to the Bench gives the impression (a) that the appointment is a reward for
political services; and (b) that the appointee’s former political allegiance will be
reflected in his or her decisions.
Protection from Undue Influences
Three core characteristics of judicial independence are said to be:
1. Security of tenure;
2. Financial security; and
3. Administrative independence.
Security of tenure
A constitution can give judges security of tenure by fixing clearly their terms of office
and ensuring that they cannot be removed from office without good cause.
Term of office
How long should a judge stay in office? There are three possibilities:
• Life tenure
• Tenure for a specified term
• Tenure until retirement at a prescribed age.
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