3
Chapter 1.
Introduction.
So far-reaching and and multi-layered is Zimbabwe’s ‘mutating’ millennial crisis, that it has
become the subject of much intense reflection and heated debate, nationally, regionally
and internationally: whispered daringly and desperately beneath the scratchy music of
Zimbabwe’s township beer halls, around the meagre fires of the newly dispossessed, and in
the endless, nation-wide queues for food, fuel, and other basics: confronted more openly in
the bold polemic of political leaders and civic activists, in increasingly tense and incredulous
diplomatic circles, and in the searching urgency of academic scholarship”. (Hammar &
Raftopoulos. 2004)1
It is common cause that Zimbabwe is in a crisis, although there are divergent views about the exact
onset of this crisis, as well as many different views of the nature of this crisis. For some the onset of the
crisis has its roots in the adoption by the Zimbabwe government, in the early 1990s, of the neo-liberal
economic policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For others, like Hammar and
Raftopoulos, the onset is less defined and multi-factoral. However, there is one aspect of the crisis that is
critical to the resolution, and highlighted so clearly in the quote above: the muted and almost silenced
voices of the ordinary people of Zimbabwe. Whilst we can be sympathetic to urgent academics and
incredulous diplomats, and understanding of need for polemics, what are the opinions of the ordinary
people?
In one of the more disturbing polls conducted in Zimbabwe last year, the Afrobarometer showed that
ordinary Zimbabweans were indeed despairing and fearful of giving voice to their opinions, but,
paradoxically, more Zimbabweans were prepared to give Robert Mugabe a favourable rating than in
1999. But Zimbabweans seemed to be losing faith in the value of democracy and the Afrobarometer
survey revealed some very pessimistic attitudes in ordinary Zimbabweans:
*
*
*
*
*
Zimbabweans are losing faith in democracy. Expressed support for this form of
government is down from two-thirds of citizens in 1999 to less than one half in 2004.
If rejection of authoritarian alternatives is included, then deep commitments to
democracy are down still further. Increasing numbers acquiesce to the idea of singleparty rule.
At the same time, political parties have not fully penetrated society; one half of all
Zimbabweans prefers to remain unaligned with either ZANU-PF or MDC. Part of the
reason is that three out of four think that party competition leads to social conflict.
By a margin of more than five to one, Zimbabweans overwhelmingly reject political
violence. Whereas MDC supporters are more likely to support violence in support of a
just cause, ZANU-PF partisans are more likely to have actually engaged in violent
political acts.
Fewer than half say they trust Robert Mugabe and the ruling party. While hardly a
strong endorsement of presidential popularity, these figures have risen since 1999. And
they far exceed the small proportions who are willing to admit trusting Morgan
Tsvangirai and opposition parties.
In analysing these above findings, as well as the findings on the economy, the Afrobarometer came to
several conclusions:
* First, some people – like party loyalists, military forces, and resettled peasant farmers –
have benefited from ZANU-PF patronage. They not only regard the economy as having
1
See A. Hammar, & B. Raftopoulos (2004), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of
Crisis, HARARE: WEAVER PRESS.
IDASA: Zimbabwe at the Cross-Roads: Views of Zimbabwean citizens on democracy and transitional justice.