built by the end of 2005,45 and of 25,000 being built by the end of August. Minister Ignatius Chombo boldly promised during 2005 that the government would build 250,000 houses each year until 2008.46 Originally, 3 billion (trillion) unbudgeted dollars were promised to the scheme by the President and various ministers. 47 Only 10% of this money ever materialised, and with inflation, even within a few months of the demolitions, the buying power of this money had been reduced to less than 5% of the promised 3 billion (trillion). How has OGHK been implemented? Inter-Ministerial Committees (IMCs) have been set up in all towns and provinces, and they are all headed by high-ranking army officers – in Bulawayo by Lt-Col Matavire. This committee has effectively taken over many of the functions that would normally be the domain of local government, including allocation of stands and houses.48 The IMC is in overall charge of the operation, including the actual costs and mechanics of building, sourcing materials and labour, the speed with which targets are met – and allocating who gets the houses. The IMC is responsible for servicing all houses they build - of connecting water and sewerage systems to those for the city; this is not the responsibility of the city council. In October 2005, it was already clear that no building targets had been met, and that in fact they had been dismally failed. And by June 2006, the failure of OGHK to deliver to more than a handful of homes to those displaced is unmistakable. Housing needs prior to OM: Bulawayo – a review of the promises Prior to the demolitions, the Bulawayo housing list stood at around 70,000 families.49 The demolition of 10,867 backyard structures and informal settlements in Bulawayo’s high density suburbs displaced an estimated 45,000 people in the city.50 By September 2005, the housing lists had risen to 80,000 families or 350,000 people – around 30% of the city’s population.51 • • 1,003 houses were promised to Bulawayo by the end of August 2005. However, only 200 were roofed by that date, and none were allocated. 41,000 vending stands in 46 markets had been promised by the end of August: none were built or allocated. confirmed the operation was not planned, by saying exactly this in parliament when presenting his supplementary budget on 16 August 2005: Supplementary Estimates for the year ending December 31, 2005; presented by the Minister of Finance on Tuesday, August 16, 2005. 45 The Chronicle, 28 July, “UN Report opinionated”, page 4. 46 Zimbabwe Independent, 9 December 2005, “Govt slips on Garikai targets”. 47 The Chronicle, 5 July, front page; 7 July, front page; 13 July, page 4, to mention a few. This amount of 3 trillion was repeatedly announced on ZTV during July and August. Financial Gazette, August 18-24, front page: Zim govt broke, Murerwa admits. Sunday News, 11 September 2005, page 11: Building material prices double. The Minister of Finance asked in his September supplementary budget for one billion (trillion) dollars to finance the previously unbudgeted OGHK during 2005 – ultimately, only 300 million (billion) was made available for the programme during 2005. 48 See Discarding the filth, op cit, by current authors for discussion of how OM has usurped control of local authorities in favour of central government. The UN report was highly critical of this trend, recommending decentralising of power to urban councils. The UN report was also highly sceptical of the appropriateness of having the army in charge of building schemes. 49 Interviews, 12 and 13 September 2005. As with most city councils in Zimbabwe, the Bulawayo City Council is MDC led and dominated: OM was conducted without consulting city councils. 50 City council estimates, based on information given to them by police doing the demolitions. 51 Using the 2000 census figure of 4.2 per family, this estimate is arrived at. 27