Background Whilst Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 was a shocking example of forced displacement in Zimbabwe, it was merely the latest in a number of large-scale, forced displacements that have taken place over the past three decades. Since 2000, Zimbabwe has witnessed the forced displacement of commercial farm workers, supporters of the MDC, and other perceived opponents of the ZANU-PF Government. Furthermore, there has been the steady migration, both legal and illegal, of millions of Zimbabweans, mainly to South Africa and the United Kingdom, due to the massive down turn in the economy and the attendant political instability as well as fleeing the political violence (SACST.2008). Previously, Zimbabwe has witnessed the migration of people during the Gukurahundi period in the 1980s, and, before this, the forced displacement of enormous number of Zimbabweans into the “protected villages”, the “keeps”, and also into exile during the Liberation War (RAU. 2016). Of course, there was the steady displacement of Zimbabweans from the land during the colonial period. However, Operation Murambatsvina was different in that the displacements were firstly urban (and peri-urban), and secondly were national without exception (ActionAid. 2005; SPT. 2005(a); SPT. 2005 (b); Forum 2005 (a); Forum. 2005 (b); Forum. 2006). In most of the previous periods, displacements took place over time. For example, the forcing of rural people into “keeps” during the Liberation War occurred over several years, and, as the security situation demanded this locally. Again, the displacement of farmworkers occurred on a farm-by-farm basis, and over nearly sixteen years now. By contrast, Operation Murambatsvina [OM] took place over a very short period, it happened in virtually every single urban environment in the country, and the targets were seemingly indiscriminate. With such massive implementation, OM attracted enormous local and international attention, and a considerable number of reports emerged dealing with the humanitarian, psycho-social and legal consequences (Vambe. 2014): the displacements even led to some analysts arguing they were a crime against humanity (Tibaijuka. 2005; OPBPG. 2005). Figure 1: Percentage changes in risk aversion, 1999 to 2014 100 90 80 87 84 72 70 66 60 53 47 51 49 50 40 10 44 34 30 20 56 Risk taker Risk averse 28 16 13 0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R4.5 R5 R6 (1999) (2004) (2005) (2009) (2010) (2012) (2014) [Source: Masununngure et al. 2017] What is evident is that OM was undoubtedly the single most powerful event for depressing risk-taking in the Zimbabwean citizenry: from a high of 84% of Zimbabweans reporting in 5

Select target paragraph3