5  The Third Phase: Deployment into the communities Although the third phase seemed initially to be wholly concerned with the Presidential Election, it is evident that the militia have remained a cornerstone in the Mugabe regime’s strategy for maintaining political control in the aftermath of highly discredited election. During the Presidential Election, the relationship between the militia, both “war veterans and youth militia, and the bases was once again seen. In the first phase, described above, the target for the militia strategy was the rural unemployed youth. There were clearly great advantages for this group in joining the militia, and, as has been described in other African settings, much of the recruiting did not have to rely upon force since the excitement and power that came with being associated with the militia was inducement itself. There are good reasons for using the young, as has been described in Liberia viii: I think they use kids because the kids don’t understand the risks. And children are easier to control and manipulate. If the commanding officer tells a child to do something, he does it. In this society, children are raised to follow instructions. Similar comments could be made about Zimbabwe. The strength of a patriarchal, commandist society puts young people in a position where they are amenable to control and adult authority. However, this is only part of the story: the susceptibility to authority and control was complimented by excitement and inducements. This too has been seen in other African settingsix: Food was very scarce; some joined to get food for themselves and their families. Some joined from peer pressure; they saw their friends join. Some joined fro adventure. Most of them joined voluntarily. Sometimes they were promised money or told they would learn to drive. There were many reports that the young men that joined the militia would get jobs, be paid, or get further education. This is evidenced not only by these reports, but also by the reports indicating that the youth were very disgruntled by the failure of ZanuPF to make good on its promises after the Parliamentary Elections and the Presidential Election. In one story carried in the Zimbabwean press, Vice-President Msika was confronted by angry youth demanding payment for their “support” during the Presidential electionx. "We worked for you and you should pay us because we sacrificed our lives campaigning for the party in dangerous conditions but some of the people who were supposed to pay us put the money to their own use," the youth said. Loyalty is not merely bought by inducements however. The militia, and certainly the adults in the “war veterans” and ZanuPF Youth, must all have been aware that many of the activities in which they were engaged were criminal, but the rationale – another “Chimurenga” – helped overcome many of the militia’s scruples. For the young though, there was no prima facie allegiance to the rhetoric of the Liberation War: these were the stories of the previous generation. Thus, other methods must have come into play, and the most likely method was compulsion, which operated in two ways. Both methods use well-known psychological techniques. The first revolves around creating a forced commitment: quite simply, get someone to participate in an act and they will be more likely to continue to do so. The process of commitment will be stronger if such commitment is done publicly, and putting young men in the situation where they commit actual violence is well known as a form of recruiting in many countries, as has been shown in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Perpetrators of Gross Human Rights Violations in the current violence in Zimbabwe.