reductions to the Statutory Liquidity Ratio resulting in an increase in money supply, budgetary reallocations, or a combination of the two. All three scenarios, within a context of chronic budget deficits, a strained fiscal base and hyperinflation, are potentially problematic and could affect efforts to curtail inflation and restore budgetary discipline. Many critical observers doubt that Operation Garikai will actually materialize. 4.3.1 A Questionable Strategy and Questionable Methods Operation Garikai is based on the scenario that Government will provide stands (plots) upon which those rendered homeless will build their new homes. This assumption poses several questions. These include: q. The capacity of local authorities to provide the access roads, trunk infrastructure and basic services to enable displaced people to build new homes in compliance with the Government’s Regional, Town and Country Planning Act; r. The need for interim solutions between the time of allocation of stands (plots) and the completion of homes by the affected people in compliance with building bylaws and standards. For the majority of displaced people, such interim arrangements would necessarily include temporary shelter/housing solutions that would resemble the structures and settlement patterns originally targeted by Operation Restore Order; s. The sourcing of readily available and affordable building materials previously supplied in part by the informal sector. As the informal sector was the initial target of and largely destroyed by Operation Restore Order, it will take some time before the supply chain can be restored. It can also be assumed that prices will rise as a result of the disruptions and inflationary pressure; t. The availability of credit facilities to ease the financial burden of the poor and limited income households to construct new homes. A number of civil society organizations that have provided such assistance in the past have not made much headway in terms of dialogue with Government to implement solutions outside the framework of government channels. Another consideration and area of concern is the method envisaged by the Government. Senior government officials, on several occasions, announced that the preparation of stands and related infrastructure would be carried out by the military assisted by youth brigades. The mission was able to witness the early stages of capital-intensive preparations in several locations, which raise the following concerns: e. While the use of machine and capital-intensive site preparation and construction methods can speed up implementation, they involve a foreign currency component. Based on past experience of similar schemes, this component is estimated at 35% to 40%. The first phase of Operation Garikai would therefore involve USD 35 - 40 million in foreign exchange which would place a further strain on fuel shortages and foreign currency reserves; d. The use of the military and youth building brigades, while also effective in speeding up site preparation and construction, is inimical to ownership of the product and the process by the community and by local authorities. Again, according to past experience, such operations pose downstream issues of sustainability and maintenance; e. Government’s track record of supplying serviced sites in recent years has been less than 5,000 stands (plots) per year, compared to the nation-wide objective of Operation Garikai to deliver 4,900 stands within a few months. 48