institute a transparent land allocation programme to full-time young and trained African commercial farmers, on the one hand, and to put in place effective agricultural support services for smallholder farmers who have been allocated land, on the other. Concerns were expressed over the present situation where land is occupied by absentee or part-time farmers, and the absence of tenure. b. Revival of the economy by appropriate macro-economic reforms more in line with a rapidly globalizing world economy; and c. Good governance at both the national and local levels. From all available evidence, Zimbabwe is currently experiencing severe socio-economic and political problems that were unimaginable ten years ago. From being a bread-basket of Southern Africa and a model of post-colonial, multiracial co-existence, Zimbabwe’s economy has deteriorated very significantly and its relations with most donor countries have been fraught with tension and animosity in the last five years. The United Nations should engage the Government of Zimbabwe to help it deal with the consequences of Operation Restore Order, as well as its present socio-economic and political problems. 7.2.4 Addressing the issue of accountability The Government of Zimbabwe is collectively responsible for what has happened. However, it appears that there was no collective decision-making with respect to both the conception and implementation of Operation Restore Order. Evidence suggests it was based on improper advice by a few architects of the operation. The people and Government of Zimbabwe should hold to account those responsible for the injury caused by the Operation. Oral evidence heard from senior Government officials, including Ministers, as well as subsequent reports in the local press and discussions in the Parliament of Zimbabwe, suggest that Operation Restore Order was neither conceived collectively in the Cabinet, nor in the ruling party’s (ZANU PF) Politburo and Central Committee. It also appears that there is now a division in Zimbabwe’s political leadership over Operation Restore Order, and that some of the leaders were caught by surprise when it was suddenly initiated as a police and military exercise. While the team was in Zimbabwe, one political leader, Mr. Pearson Mbalekwa, resigned in protest at the Operation from both the Parliament of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF’s Central Committee. Some senior ZANU-PF politicians were also reported to have expressed directly to President Mugabe their concern and objections to the manner in which the clean-up of cities was being conducted. It has also been reported in the press that the Minister of Local Government had written to the Minister of Home Affairs, under whose portfolio the Zimbabwe Republic Police falls, urging him to stop demolishing houses belonging to several cooperatives that had been established with the blessing of the Ministry of Local Government, and were, therefore, “legal”. But this was to no avail. Except for Harare, now run by a Government-appointed City Commission following the dissolution of the elected MDC-controlled City Council, the mission confirmed that the local authorities of the affected cities and towns were not consulted. Yet, under Zimbabwean law, matters to do with the enforcement of planning standards and building regulations, and matters dealing with urban management and development, fall generally under the jurisdiction of local authorities. Whilst under the Urban Council Act the Minister of Local Government has powers to overrule local authorities, none of the Mayors met by the Special Envoy said they had been advised, orally or in writing, by the relevant Minister. The police simply moved in with demolition orders. Out of fear, local authorities either complied or watched helplessly as informal trades, businesses and homes were destroyed. A good number of businesses and houses torn down were legal and paying local council taxes. 76