    Releasing paramilitary forces, undoubtedly under the control of the various branches of the security forces, to ensure electoral victories in 2000 and 2002; Beginning the general deployment of the military into civilian positions; Smashing the human resource of the MDC through Operation Murambatsvina; And, finally, a sustained assault on human rights defenders, journalists, and all potential opposition forces. Whilst this strategy ensured victory in the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections, it is evident that a combination of Operation Murambatsvina, the total melt-down of the economy, and the moves to create an electoral crisis by factions within ZANU-PF and their allies, resulted in the remarkable defeat of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF in the 2008 elections.4 The crisis could have been easily resolved by forthright action by SADC and the AU: it merely required them to insist on the result standing, demand a transfer of power, and Zimbabwe might have developed very differently in the next decade.5 This did not happen. Whatever the speculation about whether Mugabe wanted to step down, or he demanded that he be protected from stepping down, the fact is that the military took charge and ―won‖ the result of the presidential re-run. Some have called this the first coup, and even senior ZANUPF officials are candid that the military took charge and ensured the result. This result was rejected by everyone. Thus, this action was only partially successful, but it did produce the peace treaty known as the Global Political Agreement, and the creation of the Inclusive Government. Whilst this was euphemistically called a transition, and major reforms were supposed to take place, little really changed. ZANU-PF kept the major organs of power, and the security forces refused to accept the civilian authority of the MDCs. The statements of senior military officials refusing to accept the civilian authority of the part of the government occupied by the two opposition parties are notorious and common cause. During the life of the Inclusive Government, civil society became obsessed once more with constitutional reform rather than reform of the state, and this became highly divisive within civil society, taking the focus off the reform of state institutions. This is not to denigrate the achievement of the amended constitution, but rather to point out that the cynics were right: this was a peace treaty and not a transition. The constitutional process took right up until the gate of the 2013 poll, too late to have any effect on reforming the state, and ZANU-PF, through its prevaricating and obstructing, merely bided its time and energy in preparation for the 2013 elections. 6 The 2013 elections came as a thunderbolt to everyone, even to many members of ZANU-PF who could hardly believe that they had won their seats. But the effect was dramatic: Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF were re-elected by a landslide, won back their two-thirds majority, and opposition parties were thrown into total disarray. It seemed irrelevant to all that the 4 Reeler, A. P. (2017), Operation Murambatsvina and its effects on political participation. May 2017. MPOI & RAU. [http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/publication/governance-0] 5 Kwinjeh. G (2008), Staring a gift horse in the mouth. Death Spiral in Zimbabwe: Mediation, Violence and the GNU. 18 June 2008. Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit. [http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/publication/future-zimbabwe-4] 6 This conformed to the ―most likely scenario‖, most of the predictions were correct save that the election in 2013 was not violent. Here see RAU (2010), What are the options for Zimbabwe? Dealing with the obvious! Report produced by the Governance Programme. 4 May 2010. Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit. [http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/publication/activism-20]