legislation
stating
that
in
the
mining
sector,
the
51%
local
ownership
requirement
will
only
apply
to
diamonds
and
platinum.
An
addition
to
these
policy
initiatives
is
a
promise
to
move
against
corruption,
with
the
regime
targeting
members
of
the
G40
in
the
process.
The
regime
has
also
gazetted
a
three-‐month
moratorium
within
which
those
involved
in
financial
malpractices
will
be
allowed
to
return
the
funds
and
assets
back
to
the
country
‘with
no
questions
being
asked
or
charges
filed’.
On
the
expiry
of
this
moratorium
period,
the
government
intends
to
prosecute
selected
individuals.28
It
is
of
course
clear
that
Mnangagwa
and
key
members
of
the
new
regime
will
not
be
targeted
for
their
corrupt
activities,
when
there
is
clear
evidence
of
a
long
history
of
such
activities.
In
2002
a
UN
report
on
the
exploitation
of
natural
resources
in
the
DRC
reported
on
the
various
networks
involved
in
these
exploitative
activities:
The
key
strategist
for
the
Zimbabwe
branch
of
the
elite
network
the
Speaker
of
Parliament
and
former
National
Security
Minister
Mr.
Mnangagwa,
has
won
strong
support
from
senior
military
and
intelligence
officers
for
an
aggressive
policy
in
the
DRC.
Amongst
the
senior
military
figures
mentioned
were
Air
Marshall
Perence
Shiri
and
Brigadier
Sibusiso
Moyo,
the
current
Ministers
of
Lands,
Agriculture
and
Rural
Development
and
of
Foreign
Affairs
respectively.29
The
looting
of
resources
in
the
DRC
was
followed
by
what
Saunders
describes
as
the
‘privileged
access
to
Marange
diamonds’
by
a
‘shadow
axis
of
power’
which
included
‘state
security
forces
and
factions
of
the
Zanu
PF
elite’.30
Clearly,
Mnangagwa’s
intent
was
to
quickly
move
the
debate
away
from
the
form
that
this
transfer
of
power
to
his
Presidency
has
taken,
to
a
discussion
on
the
economy,
and
renewed
international
engagements.
The
dominant
mood
of
seeking
economic
and
political
stability
at
almost
any
cost
in
Zimbabwe
has
provided
the
space
for
the
military
to
legitimise
their
intervention
in
favour
of
Mnangagwa.
The
careful
avoidance
of
the
term
‘coup
d’etat’
and
the
formal
if
not
substantive
adherence
to
the
language
and
processes
of
constitutionalism
in
the
party
and
the
state
have
provided
the
veneer
of
‘legality’
through
which
SADC,
the
AU
and
the
rest
of
the
international
community
have
premised
their
muted
compliance
with
the
militarily
imposed
Mnangagwa
dispensation.
The
military
have
also
ensured
the
safety
of
Mugabe31
and
his
family
and
at
an
official
level
continue
to
revere
his
role
in
the
liberation
struggle.
The
selective
construction
of
the
legacy
of
that
struggle
has
always
been
central
to
the
legitimising
discourse
of
Zanu
PF.32
28
President
Mnangagwa
-‐
Granting
of
a
three-‐month
amnesty
for
the
return
of
Illegally
Externalised
Funds
and
Assets.
28/11/17.
29
United
Nations
Security
Council-‐Final
Report
of
the
Panel
of
Experts
on
the
Illegal
Exploitation
of
Natural
Resources
and
other
forms
of
Wealth
of
the
DRC.
16
October
2002,
p
8.
30
R.
Saunders,
Geologies
of
Power:
Conflict
Diamonds,
Security
Politics
and
Zimbabwe’s
Troubled
Transition,
in
R.
Saunders
and
T.
Nyamunda
(eds),
Facets
of
Power-‐
Politics,
Profits
and
People
in
the
Making
of
Zimbabwe’s
Blood
Diamonds.
Harare,
Weaver
Press,
Johannesburg,
Wits
University
Press,
2016,
p35.
31
Mugabe
has
also
been
granted
a
very
generous
retirement
package.
It
includes:
Staff
support,
office
and
equipment,
a
fully
furnished
official
residence,
four
international
trips
per
annum
for
him
and
his
spouse
and
full
health
benefits.
‘President
Retirement
Benefits
Gazetted’-‐
Herald
28/12/17.
32
Terence
Ranger,
‘Nationalist
Historiography,
Patriotic
History
and
the
History
of
the
Nation:
the
Struggle
over
the
Past
in
Zimbabwe’.
JSAS,
2004,
30,2,
PP.
215-‐234.
9