sought to participate in the 1995 Bookfair. Government issued a directive to the organisers, who were to some extent dependant on the Government’s cooperation to host the Fair, to bar the participation GALZ19. This directive was repeated in 1996. However, when it became uncertain that the organisers would heed the directive, Government declared a ban on the presence of GALZ, and ex post facto, sought a legal basis for the ban by invoking the Censorship Act. But the directive and ban were issued not on the basis of any acts that the members of GALZ would perform or the material they might display, but who the members were, that is, because the members were perceived as having a homosexual sexual orientation. GALZ challenged the “ban” in the High Court of Harare. During the hearing in Judges’ Chambers, Justice Sandura asked the Attorney-General’s representatives how the Censorship Act could provide for the ban of a stand, and secondly, unknown publications. The reply was to admit that the true objective was to bar GALZ itself, as they did not want the organisation at the Bookfair, regardless of what it intended to display20. Applying the jurisprudence outlined above it is clear that the attempt to bar GALZ from the Bookfair violated the right to equality and freedom from discrimination. The first requirement, that there has been discrimination is obviously met. The second test, whether the discrimination serves a legitimate government purpose must also be resolved in favour of GALZ. An appeal to public morality as the government’s legitimate interest fails because the government sought to bar, not immoral behaviour or undesirable publications but people. It sought to bar people simply on the basis of who they are, that is, that they do not conform to the prevailing heterosexual normative paradigm. In other words, rather than seeking to enforce a legitimate government objective, the State sought to bar GALZ solely on the basis that its members are “different”. To return to the point raised earlier21, it is precisely because of difference that equality jurisprudence acquires meaning. If all individuals were the same, there would be no need for prohibitions on discrimination. Difference therefore, cannot in itself be a reason not to apply equality requirements of international law and does not constitute “a purpose”. It would be easy to ensure observance of the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation if everyone were heterosexual. The equality clause would be meaningless in this context. It is precisely because other forms of sexuality exist that a principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexuality acquires meaning. As was noted in a judgement from the South African Constitutional Court dealing with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: It is easy to say that everyone who is just like ‘us’ is entitled to equality. Everyone finds it more difficult to say that those who are ‘different’ from us in some way should have the same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet so soon as we say any…group is less deserving and worthy of equal protection and benefit of the law, all minorities and all of…society are demeaned. It is so deceptively simple and so 19 See Dunton, C and Palmberg, M. Zimbabwe – The Book Fair Drama Current African Issues 19 (June, 1996) Human Rights and Homosexuality in Southern Africa at p. 9 for the text of the directive. 20 In fact, the Censorship Act was wholly inappropriate for the government’s objectives and did not even start to legitimate government’s “ban”. The discrimination was thus arbitrary in the sense that it was not in compliance with any law. The questions, therefore, of whether the “ban” served a legitimate purpose did not arise, since the ban itself was unlawful. GALZ was thus successful in obtaining the necessary interdict allowing their participation at the Fair. 21 p. 4