devastatingly injurious to say that those who are handicapped or of a different race, or religion, or colour or sexual orientation are less worthy22. “Difference” is the essence of equality jurisprudence. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation at its twentieth session in the Declaration on the Race and Racial Prejudice affirmed: All individuals…have the right to be different, to consider themselves as different and to be regarded as such 23. Government thus could not discriminate against GALZ solely on the basis of difference, when the right to be different is itself a human right. Another way of looking at the issue is to consider that even if Government could show a legitimate purpose in the ban, for example, to prevent the publication of undesirable materials, the ban would still have been a violation of rights due to ill-fit or over-breadth. The over-breadth lay in the fact that the “ban” would encompass more than undesirable materials, and included in its ambit a ban on the presence of individuals. However, since the ban did not have any ostensible legitimate government purpose, the third test does not arise. Specific Mention The second issue raised for discussion is whether sexual orientation requires specific mention in an equality or non-discrimination clause. In this regard, the Bookfair scenario illustrates an important point. Those adopting a lifestyle, which differs from the heterosexual normative paradigm, face discrimination regardless of any conduct, in which they may engage. To ensure equality, it is insufficient simply to remove archaic legislation, which seeks to regulate sexual mores. A more general protection is required. The question, which then remains to be answered, is whether that protection is already contained in the prohibition on discrimination based on “any other status”. The equality clause of Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status 24. It is clear from this wording and the wording of the international Human Rights Instruments, which followed, that the specific grounds mentioned are intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive. Judgements of the European Human Rights Court remove any doubts in this regard. In Marckx, for example the court declared discriminatory treatment of an unmarried mother a violation of the equality provisions, employing the “other status” provision of the Convention25. However, the question still persists as to why some grounds are mentioned and not others. The list may be limited only by the somewhat boundless capacity humans have for discrimination. Age, accent, beauty, health, height etc. could all be added. The effect, however, of adding new categories would simply be to dilute and render the inclusion of the original categories 22 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others CCT11/98 at para. 22. 23 Quoted in Heinze op. cit. p. 209. And see Wisconsin v Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a case concerning the Amish, on the right to be different. 24 25 Article 2 Marckx v Belgium Judgement of 13th June, 1979, Series A No. 31 and see Heinze op. cit. p. 224. See also Inze v Austria Judgement of 28th October, 1987, Series A No, 126; and Darby Judgement of 23rd October, 1990, Series A, No. 187.