black fly in a glass of white milk”. The civil service and the system as a whole remained largely Rhodesian, as of course did the economy. When the first major systemic and structural changes in the state and its security apparatus did take place in the mid-1980’s, the primary focus was on removing whites and replacing them with blacks. The real beneficiaries of this restructuring process were largely black Zimbabweans who had served the Rhodesian state and were quickly learning new slogans and camouflaging their past. With the exception of the ZNA, the majority of senior command and management in the state security sector, and indeed in much of the state machinery, were in fact from the former Rhodesian security apparatus. So whilst we can say that the state and the security sector machinery were transformed from being white dominated to black dominated in the mid-1980’s, the real question is whether this process resulted in qualitative transformation, including changes in doctrine and orientation. Finally in this regard we should look at the legislative framework governing the security sector. Here it is all too clear that almost nothing changed for over three decades. The Rhodesian security laws remained intact in most respects until the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, and even today we still await re-alignment of many of the Rhodesian legacy security laws. I would therefore argue that all the factors I have outlined above impacted enormously and negatively on fundamental transformation prospects and processes and that, in this regard, key aspects of security sector doctrine and its application did not fundamentally change during the first decade of independence. There were however other opportunities and I will briefly examine these and their impact on security sector policy and doctrine. Following independence itself, the next transformational opportunity could have been triggered by the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and PF- ZAPU. Whilst ZAPU veterans might argue that some useful changes did take place, and of course the carnage in western Zimbabwe ceased, no fundamental policy or doctrinal shifts followed this event. Much of the disputation leading up to this agreement had been about the name of the party and the allocation of leadership posts. The inclusion of ZAPU into the new united ZANU(PF) does not appear to have had a significant impact on transformation prospects or triggered any substantial debate about security sector governance despite the fact that senior ZAPU leaders had previously complained vociferously about the absence of the rule of law and the cruel and repressive treatment visited on ZAPU members and leaders including the Gukurahundi events. And whilst the hostility towards former ZPRA cadres decreased in the army and soldiers could focus on developing their military capacities on a more professional basis, few major changes in the military or other security services doctrine or posture were observed. One should note however, that 9