Jürgen Schurr Another challenge, of course, is that, if we speak about rights of victims, we need to consider whether a legal framework exists that provides for these rights or whether legislation must first be drafted to enshrine these rights at national level, and how to enforce these rights – often a very delicate question, in particular where transition has yet to take place. For instance, in Libya, after decades of repression, the newly established National Transitional Council has adopted a transitional justice law that fails to mention explicitly the right of victims to justice and to reparation; it also does not spell out what type of mechanism will be established to investigate the legacies of violations. As a result, either the law will require amendment or a separate piece of legislation will be required to ensure that rights of victims are adequately taken into account in the months and years of transition to come. It appears that, where a right to reparation specifically in regard to human rights abuses during conflict and/or repressive regimes is firmly enshrined in law, it is much more difficult for a government to renege later on its promise to deliver reparation. If it does, human rights groups at least have a starting point for holding the government accountable. Relevant reparation mechanisms and victims’ right to reparation have, for instance, been firmly established in legislation in Sierra Leone, in South Africa and in Peru, but this does not exist at the moment in Libya, Nepal or Rwanda, countries where survivors continue to struggle to obtain reparation. The identification of victims is vital, as it determines who will benefit from reparation. While international law provides clear guidance as to who qualifies as a victim of a human rights crime, in practice it has proved to be very contentious, and depends on who is in government and, to some extent, on the cultural context. Governments may choose to make ethnicity the determining factor in defining who qualifies as a victim, a strategy that risks excluding those who belong to another group, and reparation measures, such as compensation payments, may therefore easily divide rather than reconcile. Not all violations committed in a particular conflict might be included in transitional justice efforts, which then also have an impact on who is entitled to reparation. In addition, should perpetrators of violence who later become victims of human rights abuses by the state benefit from reparation? In Peru, armed groups had fought government forces over decades, often in a very brutal manner. The Truth Commission had to decide whether those who had been part of the opposition forces, whom the public referred to as ‘terrorists’, should qualify as victims. It recommended that victims of serious abuses by government forces 26 International Conference on Transitional Justice, Zimbabwe