The Global Experience of Transitional Justice should receive reparations, regardless of their association with an armed group. While this definition is in line with international law, the government of Peru ultimately rejected the Commission’s recommendation, and today’s reparation programme explicitly excludes members of armed groups and their families. The law establishing the programme even provides that ‘members of subversive organizations are not considered victims’. This is not only contrary to international law, and potentially divisive within Peru, but it is also difficult in practice to determine and identify those who had been members of a subversive group. This brings us to the implementation of reparation processes in the aftermath of a repressive regime or a violent conflict. As already mentioned, ordinary court processes might not often be a solution, as the magnitude of the crimes and victims affected would lead to an overburdening of the legal system and to delays in providing reparation. Furthermore, often a legal system does not exist that would allow victims to put their claims forward, as is currently the case in Libya or was in the immediate aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda. Increasingly, states in transition establish reparation programmes that aim to provide the type of reparation necessary under the circumstances – either material, medical or symbolic – and the forms of distribution – either collective, benefiting entire communities, as, for instance, in Peru, or individual, in the form of compensation, for example. Again, the process of designing programmes should be guided by broad consultation. According to the Guidance Note of the UN Secretary-General, ‘experience has shown that the most successful reparation programmes are designed in consultation with affected communities, particularly victims and women groups’.4 Reparation programmes can complement truth-seeking mechanisms. Indeed, the truth commissions established in South Africa, Sierra Leone, Morocco, Peru, Chile and Argentina actually recommended the establishment of reparation programmes. Reparation programmes can also complement prosecution initiatives, such as happened, to some extent, in Bosnia and Rwanda; it appears that reparation programmes, if established, would come after the prosecution of those responsible. Generally, a prompt establishment is important, as the implementation of reparation programmes will usually require a lot of time. A delay in the establishment results in a risk that many victims – in particular the elderly, or 4  United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice. International Conference on Transitional Justice, Zimbabwe 27