CMI BRIEF JUNE 2010 VOLUME 9 NO.3 ZIMBABWE´S MULTILAYERED CRISIS ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions. From the start of the mediation process it was clear that President Mbeki’s efforts were concentrated on reaching an agreement that would result in a generally acceptable election process in 2008. For Mbeki, the acceptability of the election was a key ingredient to settling the issue of international legitimacy and beginning the process of normalising the Zimbabwe crisis. By the end of 2007 the South African mediation resulted in a minimum agreement on creating conditions for a free and fair election. The election took place on 29 March 2008 amid relatively peaceful conditions. To the surprise of many, especially ZANU-PF, the two MDC formations won most of the parliamentary seats, with Morgan Tsvangirai’s faction (MDC-T) winning more seats than the rival MDC-M faction led by Arthur Mutambara. Furthermore, Tsvangirai won the first round of the presidential vote but without the 51 per cent majority needed for an outright victory. Despite the peaceful atmosphere of the March elections, developments before and after the polls betrayed the minimum agreement reached under South Africa’s mediation. For starters, the March election date was unilaterally set by Robert Mugabe, despite the MDC’s concerns that more reforms were required before an election could take place. Moreover, there was much contestation over the results, particularly since it took ZANU-PF nearly a month to announce them. Based on the election results it was clear that ZANU-PF was on the ropes. A rerun of the presidential election under free and fair conditions would most likely see the demise of Mugabe’s tenure. Consequently, the regime inflicted the worst electoral violence on the population since the Matabeleland massacres of the mid 1980’s, resulting in Tsvangirai pulling out of the presidential rerun and a rejection of the outcome by major international bodies, including the usually compliant SADC and African Union (AU). A GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND A COALITION GOVERNMENT In the aftermath of this election debacle and the continued lack of a legitimate government in Zimbabwe, Mbeki’s mediation came under increasing criticism. However, the disastrous economic and humanitarian conditions in the country, the continued pressure from SADC and the rest of the international community, an emboldened array of MDC supporters including social forces and civic groups and a weakened ZANU-PF provided the combined conditions for an agreement. It should, however, be taken into account that MDC is itself divided between two factions each with ambiguous political positions. After several months of further negotiations between the Zimbabwean parties, Mbeki managed to secure a Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 that might be described as an unhappy compromise between the major political parties. The major parts of the agreement included a land audit, a commitment to economic stabilisation and growth, and a call for the removal of sanctions. The agreement also called for the promotion of national healing, constitutional reform, and a fostering of democratic spaces through the introduction of various commissions on elections, media and human rights. At the same time, the GPA is challenged by concerns over the next election and a ruling party that has refused to give up state power after an electoral loss. Indeed, ZANU-PF continues to control of the central levers of the military and security sectors and controls the ministries responsible for these forces. The party has thus far declared an unwillingness to consider any reform that might weaken this control. This is paralleled by a lack of any substantive budgetary support to the Inclusive Government and to those social delivery ministries (e.g. health, education) occupied by the MDC. Budgetary conflicts have further divided the transitional government with ZANUPF claiming that the MDC was already receiving favourable treatment from the donors. Mugabe’s position is also buttressed by his continued attempts to frame his political actions as anti-colonialist struggles and SADC solidarity around this trope. From this position, Mugabe has succeeded in moving the centre of the debate to the West’s unwillingness to accept an African agreement. Mugabe’s framing is especially salient in the face of the West’s demands for democracy and respect for human rights as a contradiction to the realities of global political and economic inequality. In addtion it is easy 3