Judgment No. CCZ 9/18 Civil Appeal No. CCZ 5/18 The second principle entails the adoption of a broad approach where any derogation from guaranteed rights and freedoms is given a very narrow and strict construction to avoid the diminishing or the dilution of the rights or freedoms. In this regard, the court venerates the fundamental right or freedom as primary while regarding the limitation as secondary. This second principle was adverted to by MALABA DCJ (as he then was) in Chimakure and Others v AG (supra), where he was discussing the acceptable limitations to the freedom of expression. As he rightly observed at p491D-E: “It would not be an interference (limitation) within the meaning of the Constitution if the measure adopted by Government amounts to authorisation of the destruction or abrogation of the right to freedom of expression itself. To control the manner of exercising a right should not Signify its denial or invalidation.” (The emphasis and insertion of the word “limitation” are mine). He proceeded at page 494H to sum up the approach that the court should take and which approach I intend to take in this matter, as follows: “In the determination of the issues raised, it is ever so important to bear in mind that, every new legislative restriction on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, has the effect of reducing the existing realm of freedom of expression whilst adding to and expanding the area of governmental control of the exercise of the fundamental right. It is the duty of the court as guardian of the constitution and fundamental rights and freedoms to ensure that only truly deserving cases are added to the category of permissible legislative restrictions of the exercise of the right…” ANALYSIS Having found that s 27 of POSA infringes the fundamental rights granted by s 59 of the Constitution, and being guided by the general approach described above, the ultimate test as stated above, is to establish whether or not s 27 can be saved by s 86 (2) of the Constitution. 12