This section cannot pretend to be a complete social and political analysis of Zimbabwe prior to 1997, but covers the areas identified by many political observers as being significantly related to the climate of discontent and discouragement felt by the Zimbabwean public at the time of the Food Riots. It also identifies the factors that observers felt were indicative of a crisis of governance in Zimbabwe. The areas are described under various sub-headings below. Trends in 1997 1997 was a year in which initial expectations of dynamic growth were replaced by a disappointing performance and increasing pessimism about future prospects. Zimbabwe appeared to have turned the corner towards sustainable recovery earlier on in the year. Coming out of an impressive 1996 during which signs of recovery had started to emerge in the last six months, the country started 1997 on a high note with all indicators pointing to an economic upswing. The major concern to the country earlier in the year was the excessive rains that lashed the land as these threatened to reduce agricultural output. There was however a positive development in that the rains replenished the dams that had run dry due to successive droughts affecting the winter crops which depend on irrigation, and, even though it had been clear that agricultural production would be lower due to the excessive rains, both independent commentators and the Government were already projecting an economic growth rate of up to 5% over the year. The country had earlier on achieved a gross domestic product growth of slightly more than 8% in 1996 on the back of increased agricultural production. The economic projections for 1997 were soon revised downwards, with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) putting it at about 4,5%, and other economic commentators were estimating that the economic growth rate for 1997 could be below 3%. However, the modest recovery in 1996 proved too fragile to withstand the subsequent increases in taxes, interest rates and inflation that took effect at the end of the first half of 1997. Although inflation pressures had largely remained muted during the better part of the year, arbitrary increases in the plethora of Government-administered prices to meet Government's excessive spending requirements triggered a resurgence in inflation, with analysts saying that inflation would round-off 1997 at above 20%. The monetary authorities had expressed the desire to bring down inflation to around 15% by the end of 1997. The commentators were all agreed that the major factors that destroyed confidence in the year under review were the Government's decision to award ex-combatants gratuities totalling Z$4,5 billion, money that the country could not afford, followed by the designation of in excess of 1 500 large-scale commercial farms which included the country's most productive holdings. With a third of the country's large-scale commercial farmers expecting to lose their land and all farmers being affected by the possibility of a poor season ahead, conditions had turned against business interests throughout the economy. The biggest casualty of the loss in confidence was the country's currency which plunged to an all-time low in November 1997, by as much as 75% against most major currencies. The spread between buy and sell rates in the money market were at a ludicrous 73%. There were a number of factors that prevailed in November 1997 and provided the backdrop to the collapse of the dollar but, according to Bulawayo-based economist, Eric Bloch, fundamentally, the cause had been the rampant inflation that had prevailed in Zimbabwe since 1982. Other factors included currency speculation amid reports that the country's foreign currency reserves had declined to less than two months import cover. The monetary authorities were not spared either, as the analysts were adamant that both the RBZ and Government were inexcusably tardy in reacting as the crisis unfolded. Even though the RBZ later intervened in the market to shore up the local currency, the analysts said they were still not clear as to the direction the dollar was likely to take. All were agreed that the current account deficit was unsustainable and would necessitate a retightening of exchange controls.