nearly 10% points from just three Provinces. 17 Thus, it would be obvious that the strategy behind the violence would be to increase the ZANU PF vote in ZANU PF strongholds and to reduce the MDC share in constituencies won by the MDC, which was a strategy observed in the 2005 elections, albeit with intimidation and coercion around access to food rather than the blunt violence seen currently. 18 The vast proportion of the victims was composed of self-admitted members of the MDC, often holding positions of authority or leadership. Many reported having been involved in the March elections, and a further large percentage [12%] reported that they were attacked because of a perceived affiliation to the MDC, or the possibility of voting for the MDC. One unusual feature was the reporting of violations by a few members of ZANU PF, who do not usually report to the Human Rights Forum, and perhaps the answer lies in the finding reported immediately above; ZANU PF supporters were voting for the party in the House of Assembly and Senate elections, but not for Robert Mugabe. The distribution of the victims strongly conforms to the patterns seen in previous elections, and especially to the election in 2002. Nearly 80% of the cases came from rural as opposed to urban areas, as was commonly seen in 2000 and 2002. Table 4 Affiliation MDC WOZA ZESN ZANU PF NCA Other Unknown Reported affiliations of victims [n=285] Number [Percentage] 250[88%] 0 0 0 1[0.4%] 10[4%] 23[8%] As was indicated in the findings from the large data set, virtually no reports implicated the MDC in violence, and rather the data corroborates the view that ZANU PF Youth and ZANU PF supporters were the major perpetrators alleged in the reports [see Table 5 below]. Incidentally, about 12% provided names of perpetrators, but it is also evident from the statements that the victims knew the names of many of their perpetrators when the group was composed of locals. However, in many cases, it also evident that the perpetrators were not local, as was also frequently reported in reports of previous elections. 17 18 As can be seen in Appendix 1, 26 of the 41 constituencies come from the three Mashonaland Province, and 9 of the 10 most violent constituencies are from one or other of the Mashonaland Provinces, 5 of which were won by ZANU PF. For an analysis of the 2005 election, see Reeler, A.P., & Chitsike, K.C (2005), Trick or Treat? The effects of the pre-election climate on the poll in the 2005 Zimbabwe Parliamentary Elections. June 2005. PRETORIA: IDASA.