Table 5 Reported affiliation of alleged perpetrators [n=285]19 Alleged Perpetrator Number [%] CIO 11[4%] MDC 2[0.7%] War Veterans 45[16%] Zimbabwe National Army [ZNA] 69[24%] ZANU PF Youth 102[36%] ZANU PF Supporter 77[27%] Zimbabwe Republic Police 43[15%] Zimbabwe Republic Police [CID] 10[4%] Zimbabwe Republic Police [Riot] 10[4%] Unknown 24[8%] As was seen in past elections, non-state actors – ZANU PF and war veterans – were overwhelmingly named as the perpetrators,20 but it is unusual on past experience to see the ZNA mentioned so frequently, supporting the notion that the ZNA has been intimately involved in the violence. The smaller data set showed the ZNA as much more frequent perpetrators than the larger data set, but, on either data set, the ZNA are mentioned much more frequently than in previous election reports. At indicated above, the MDC was hardly mentioned, and, interestingly in relation to the Zimbabwe government’s allegations about MDC violence, only in cases of intra-party violence, and the few ZANU PF supporters that reported to the Human Rights Forum also mentioned intra-party conflict as the major reason for the violation. Thus, the evidence from the legal statements strongly supports the earlier finding that the violence is systematic in its application, and, although mostly against one political party, the MDC, almost exclusively so. Since the legal statements provided both times and places for the alleged violations, it was possible to examine the notion that state and non-state actors were allegedly operating in concert. Most significant were the very reports of the involvement of the ZNA and all other groups, as the ZNA has not previously been identified in violence during elections with such a high frequency, and this strongly supports the many allegations in the press and media that the military have a controlling role in the violence, probably under the direction of the JOC. The reports of the involvement of the ZNA have occurred outside of any formally proclaimed state of emergency or martial law, and hence their 19 20 Note that the number of perpetrators does not add up to 100%, as there was frequently more than one type of alleged perpetrator involved in an incident. Here see Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2000), Who is responsible? A preliminary analysis of pre-election violence in Zimbabwe, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001), Who was responsible? A consolidated analysis of pre-election violence in Zimbabwe, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2002), “Are They Accountable?: Examining alleged violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March 2002”, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM.